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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a commercial lease dispute. The appeal raises questions concerning

the District Court's ruling denying Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd and Timothy Pace's (collectively
"DPP") Motion for 56(f) Continuance, as well as its decision to consider Boise Mode, LLC's ("Boise
Mode") motion for reconsideration of a motion to amend or alter a judgment In addition, the appeal
calls into question the District Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Boise Mode.

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELO'"
This lawsuit commenced on January 20, 2010, when Boise Mode filed its Verified

Complaint, alleging damages arising out of a breach of commercial lease. R., at
Answer and Counterclaim on or about February 11, 2010.

R., at 80.

13. DPP filed its

In the Answer and

Counterclaim, the Defendants/Counter-Claimant alleged a variety of affirmative defenses and
counter-claims. R., at 80-91. On April 8, 2010, Defendants/Counter-Claimant served their First Set
of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and First Set of Requests for Admissions
on Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant R., at 114-115. Boise Mode served Answers
DPP's discovery on May 10, 2010.

R., at 118-119.

Responses to

It served DPP with its First

Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admission on June 24,
2010, approximately five months after commencing the lawsuit. R., at 127-129. DPP served its

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - PAGE 4

Responses to Boise Mode's Requests for Admission on July 23, 2010, and its Answers and
Responses to the Interrogatories on August 5, 2010. R., at 130-131; 156-136. DPP served
subpoenas duces tecum on The North Face and Colliers Idaho Property Management, LLC on
November 15, 201 O. R., at 354-360; 357-358. The North Face did not attend the scheduled
December 1,2010 deposition; I Colliers Idaho Property Management, LLC contacted DPP' s counsel
and reported that it previously had turned over the requested files to Boise Mode. R., at 365-366.
On Wednesday, November 24, 2010, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the Plaintiff/CounterDefendant served the following documents on the Defendants/Counter-Claimant: (1) Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Verified Complaint; (2) Motion for Summary Judgment on CounterClaimant's Counterclaims; (3) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Verified Complaint; (4) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaims; (5) Affidavit of Steven F. Schosssberg, Esq. (sic) In
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; (6) Affidavit of David L. Baum In Support
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; (7) Affidavit of Angela Aeschliman, CPM, CCIM In
Support of Plaintiff' s Motion for Summary Judgment; and (8) Affidavit of Christopher Kiefor, CPA,
In Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment R., at 366. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
set its motions for summary judgment for hearing on December 22,2010, at 3:00 p.m. R., at 440-

I The North Face objected to service on December 7, 2010, which was six days after the
December 1,2010 deposition date, and one day before DPP's Opposition to Boise Mode's Motion
for Summary Judgment was due.
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441.
DPP filed a Motion for 56(f) Continuance and 56(f) Affidavit of Counsel in Support of
Motion for Continuance on December 8, 2010. R., at 361-419. The District Court heard oral
argument on the Motion for Continuance all December 22,2010, and denied it. R., at 451-452. On
the same day, it heard oral argument all Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment, and, granted
it on December 27,2010. R., at 451-460. The first final judgment was entered (the "Judgment")
on January 5,2011, R., at 461-462.
DPP filed a Motion to Amend Judgment Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 59(e) ("Motion to Amend") on
January 19,2011. R., at 481-491. The District Court heard oral argument on the Motion to Amend
on February 28, 2011. R., at 517. In an order dated March 2, 2011, the District Court reversed
summary judgment on the following causes of action of Boise Mode: (1) Breach of Contract; (2)
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Breach of Personal Guaranty of Lease. The
District let stand summary judgment on Boise Mode's Tortious Interference and Negligent
Supervision claims, but reinstated DPP' s Constructive Eviction, Breach of Contract and Breach of
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing causes of action. R., at 517-525. The District Court also
voided the January 5, 2011, Judgment. R., at 524.
On April 13,2011, DPP filed a Motion to Compel Boise Mode to provide full, complete,
accurate and non-evasive Answers and Responses to Interrogatories No. 18 and 19, as well as
Request for Production NO.3. R., at 526-527. DPP has served another subpoena duces tecum on
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The North Face on or about April 28, 2011. (Transcript) Boise Mode, in turn, opposed the Motion
to Compel, but filed supplemental answers and responses to the discovery at issue. R., at 606; 603;
621. It also filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Further Reconsideration, requesting that the
Court reverse its order granting DPP' s Motion to Amend, grant summary judgment on its causes of
action and on DPP' s counterclaims. DPP opposed the Motion for Reconsideration. R., at 581. The
District Court heard oral argument on May 23, 2011, and granted the Motion for
and Further Reconsideration. R., at 642-648. As a result, the District Court mled

Motion to

Compel moot. R., at 642-48. This appeal followed after entry of a second final Judgment on August
26,2011. R., at 686-687, 689.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Boise Mode and DPP entered into a commercial lease agreement ("Lease") on November 3,

2006 for space in a building Boise Mode owned, and which is located at 800 W. Idaho Street, Boise,
Idaho. R., at 8-9. Timothy Pace, one of DPP's owners, signed a personal guaranty. R., at 8-9.
As early as August 2008, DPP informed Boise Mode that it was breaching the Lease. R., at
276-278,303, 306,307,321,324,326,327,328. For example, in a letter from Timothy Pace to
Boise Mode representative Angela Aeschliman dated December

2009, DPP

formally advised Boise Mode's property manager on August 15. 2008

it

to

resulting from construction activities that make this situation untenable and inhibit" its "ability to
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conduct business as a professional services office .... " R., at 303? Mr. Pace reiterated the
proposition to Ms Aeschliman in a March 6, 2009, letter. R., at306. As with the December 17,
2009 letter, the March 6, 2009 letter identified a litany of problems that DPP was having with the
building, including debilitating noise and disruptions during business hours that required DPP
employees to work outside the office, dangerous tools and materials left in hallways, an

a

installed ceiling fan that allowed water to leak into the premises, and an
construction crew without authorization took over DPP' s reception area.

at 306.

from Mr. Pace to Ms. Aeschliman, dated May 20, 2009, adds disruptions in utility and elevator
services to the already lengthy list. R., at 307.
Boise Mode acknow ledged that there were problems. For example, in a May 13,2009, letter
from Ms. Aeschliman to Timothy Pace, Boise Mode acknowledged that it was aware that
"construction of the building had caused inconveniences." R., at 294. Likewise, Ms. Aeschliman
acknowledged "there had been noise and disturbance" as a result of the construction. R., at 300. In
addition to other problems that DPP had at the premises, the same letter discusses issues related to
"noise, the elevator, the hallways, and etcetera." R., at 300, 295.
In response to the myriad of problems it encountered at the building
stopped making rent payments in or about December 2008.

R., at 453.

The

unsuccessfully to resolve the dispute, but by October 5,2009, Boise Mode demanded

2 Ms. Aeschliman states in her affidavit at paragraph 8 that she believes Mr. Pace's letter
should read "December 17,2008."
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back rent, or failing that, DPP had to vacate the premises. R., at 453. DPP vacated the premises in
November 2009. R., at 453. This lawsuit followed.

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Motion for Continuance

The decision whether to grant a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the court.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Corbus, 7 Idaho 481,63 P. 884 (1901); Corey v. Blachvell Lumber Co.,
Idaho 460, 149 P. 510 (1915).

2.

Interpretation of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over the interpretation of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Canyon County Bd. OfEqualization v. Al1wlgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58,
60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006).

3.

Summary Judgment

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, the reviewing court applies the same
standard as that which was applied by the District Court in granting summary judgment. Mackay
v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. IRC.P. 56(c); Loomis v. City of
Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 436,807 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1991). In cases such as this, where ajury trial has
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been requested, "the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidentiary facts." Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036,895 P.2d 1229
(eL App. 1995); see also Bonzv. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991)(summary judgment

standard requires District Court and Supreme Court on review to liberally construe facts in existing
record in favor of nonmoving party).

II.
APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the District Court err when it denied Defendants/Counter-Claimant Donahoe Pace &
Partners LTD and Timothy Pace's Motion for Continuance Pursuant to IRCP. 56(f)?

2.

Did the District Court err in considering and ruling on Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant's
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration?

3.

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff/CounterDefendant Boise Mode, LLC on all of Defendants/Counter-Claimant Donahoe Pace &
Partners LTD and Timothy Pace's claims in its Counter-Complaint?

4.

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff/CounterDefendant Boise Mode, LLC on all claims in its Verified Complaint?

III.
ARGUMENT
By denying DPP's Motion for 56(f) Continuance, the District Court prevented DPP
from being able to conduct full and fair discovery. In so doing, the District Court abused its
discretion, and, as a result, the Judgment against DPP should be reversed. The District Court also
committed reversible error when it entertained Boise Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and
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Further Consideration, as that motion requested reconsideration of an order entered on a motion filed
under I.R.c.P. 59(e). Furthermore, the District Court committed reversible error by granting
summary judgment to Boise Mode on its causes of action and on DPP's counterclaims because the
record unequivocally evidenced the existence of questions of material fact on the issues of breach
and constructive eviction.

A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion vVhen It Denied DPP's Motion for
Continuance Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 56(f).

I.R.c.P. 56(f) permits a court to order a continuance of summary judgment proceedings
"should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition .... " Although a
discretionary matter, see, for example, Corey v. Blackwell LUlnber Co., 27 Idaho 460, 149 P. 510
(1915), courts "usually grant properly filed Rule 56(f) motions as a matter of course." Doe v.
Abington Friends School, 480 F3D 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007).3 This is especially true in cases where
"there are discovery requests outstanding or relevant facts are under the control of the moving party."
See id.; see also Ward v. United States, 471 F2d 667,670 (3d Cir. 1977); Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle
v. Yelton, 439 F3d 191, 196-97 (4 lh Cir. 2006)(holding District Court abused discretion in denying
motion for 56(f) continuance in part because denial "particularly inappropriate when, as here, 'the

3 "Federal case law provides persuasive authority when interpreting rules under the I.R.C.P.
that are substantially similar to rules under the FR.C.P." Terra West, Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust,
LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2011); see also Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 275, 723
P.2d 814, 819 (1986)(noting that whenever possible, the Court should "interpret[] our rules of civil
procedure in confOlmance with the interpretation place upon the same rules by the federal courts.")
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materials sought are the object of outstanding discovery" and when the information sought is
"possessed only by her opponent"); Estate Contractors Ass 'n of E. Pa. v. City of Philadelphia, 945
F.2d 1260, 1263 (3d Cir. 1991)("If information concerning the facts to be discovered is solely in the
possession of the movant ... 'a motion for continuance of a motion for summary judgment for
purposes of discovery should ... ordinarily be granted almost as a matter or course'
liberally granted."

Motions for a 56(f) continuance are "broadly favored and

Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868 (5 th Cir. 2007)(holding

abused

discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for 56(f) continuance where plaintiff's discovery requests
filed "more than two months before the end of discovery. . ..

see, e.g., Nidds v. Schindler

Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912 (9 th Cir. 1996)(indicating could be abuse of discretion to deny motion
for 56(f) continuance where movant had discovery requests outstanding and cutoff date for discovery
months away); Visa Int'l Servo Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of America, 784 F.2d 1472 (9 th Cir.
1986)(holding District Court abused its discretion in denying motion for 56(f) continuance to
conduct further discovery). At the summary judgment stage, the non-moving party's burden "rests
on the assumption that the party 'had a full opportunity to conduct discovery'."

v. Abington

Friends School, 480 F.3D at 257, quoting Anderson v.
Applying these principles, the District Court abused its

(1
LLlLl"-'''.'C1

for Continuance. Notably, the District Court's ruling did not question

adequacy of

56(f)

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Continuance, or DPP' s need for additional discovery
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to oppose Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment. R, at 452. Instead, the only articulated
basis for the District Court's denial of the Motion for Continuance was that DPP "did not provide
sufficient reasoning as to why six months intervened between the receipt of initial discovery
answers" which DPP alleged were unsatisfactory, and "any attempt too discover additional relevant
information.,,4 R, at 452.
Under the circumstances ofthis case, the Court's rationale is
to

a sixth month delay between receipt of Boise Mode's discovery
North Face and Colliers Idaho Property Management, LLC. But service

subpoenas pre-dated

Boise Mode's November 24,2010 Motion for Summary Judgment by nine (9) days. R, at 358,360.
Furthermore, The North Face failed to attend the December 1,2010 deposition as scheduled, and
Colliers Idaho Property Management, LLC informed DPP that it previously had turned over the
requested files to Boise Mode and would not attend its December 1, 2010. R., at 365-366.
Therefore, not only were discovery requests outstanding at the time of Boise Mode's Motion for
Summary Judgment, but Boise Mode had sale possession of some the materials DPP was seeking.
As such, the only way DPP could obtain the infonnation it needed to support
Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment

case and

to file a

4Boise Mode served its Answers to DefendantiCounterclaimant' s First Set ofInterrogatories
and Responses to Defendant/Counterclaimant' s First Set of Requests for Production of Documents
on May 10,2010. Boise Mode served its subpoenas on The North Face and Colliers Idaho Property
Management, LLC on November 15,2010.
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Mode and serve another subpoena on The North Face. s Meanwhile, DPP's opposition papers were
due by December 8,2010.
As the authority relied on above makes amply clear, properly supported motions for 56(f)
continuance are ordinarily granted as a "matter of course." Estate Contractors Ass 'n ofE. Pa. v. City

of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d at 1263. It is an abuse of its wide discretion when a court, as is the case
is an outstanding

here, denies a properly suppOlied motion for summary judgment

See Doe v.

discovery request and the information sought is in the control of the

at 670; Ingle ex reL

Abington Friends School, 480 F.3D at 257; Ward v. United States, 471

Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d at 196-97; Estate Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of
Philadelphia, 945 F.2d at 1263; see also XRT, Inc. v. Krellenstein, 448 F.2d 772 (5 th eir.
1971 )(holding summary judgment premature because district court did not require production of
documents held by defendants). Furthermore, the deadline for initiating discovery was almost two
months away when DPP served the subpoenas, as was the deadline for opposing motions for
summary judgment. As such, considerations of prejudice and delay of proceedings were irrelevant.
Nor was there anything in the record that intimates relevant information would not

See, e.g., Zell v. IntercapitalIncome Securities, Inc., 675 F.2d 1041

discovered.

.1

court's summary judgment where nothing in record barred the possibility that

information

The North Face questioned whether the subpoena was served properly; however, it
undeniably had notice of it, yet failed to attend or object to the subpoena at any time before the
December 1, 2010 deposition date.
5
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might be discovered). Therefore, granting a short continuance would have been of no moment,
prejudiced no one, and would have laid to rest any doubts that DPP had not had "had a full
opportunity to conduct discovery." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 257.
As analyzed herein, the facts of this case compel the conclusion that the District Court abused
its considerable discretion in denying DPP's Motion for 56(f) Continuance.

As such, DPP

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's order denying DPP's Motion for
56(f) Continuance and granting summary judgment against DPP.

B.

The District Court Erred In Considering and Ruling on Boise Mode's Motion
for Reconsideration and Further Consideration of an Order Entered on a
:Motion Filed Under I.R.c.P. 59(e).

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration
requested review of the Court's March 2, 2011, Order granting DPP's Motion to Amend Judgment
Pursuant to I.R.CP. 59(e) ("Motion to Amend"), and reinstating some of DPP's causes of action.
R., at 563. In the Motion to Amend, DPP urged the District Court to amend the Judgment it entered
on January 5,2011, because it was predicated on errors in law. R, at 482. Inexplicably, the Court
deemed DPP's Motion to Amend to be a motion for reconsideration under I.R.CP. 11(a)(2)(B) and
a Motion to Amend the Judgment pursuant to I.RCP. 59(e), which is how it was captioned. R, at
518,481.
DPP objected to Boise Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration
because I.R.CP 1 1(a)(2)(B) does not permit motions for reconsideration of orders entered on a
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motion filed pursuant to LR.CP. 59(e). R., at 584-590,639-641. The District Court rejected this
argument, relying on Elliot v. Danvin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 785, 69 P.3d 1035, 1046
(2003), for the proposition that pursuant to LR.CP. 11 (a)(2)(B), a court can reconsider and vacate
any interlocutory order before the entry of final judgment. R., at 644.
The issue is one of interpretation of LR.CP. 1 1(a)(2)(B). The Idaho Supreme Court
exercises free review over the interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See
County Bd. OJEqualization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58,60,137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006).
The Court has applied rules of statutory construction to interpret the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
See ObendorJ v. Terra Hug Spray Company, 145 Idaho 892, 900, 188 P.3d 834, 842 (2008);
Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389,396,405 P.2d 634,637-38 (1965).
Interpretations generally should give meaning to each word, sentence and clause. See ObendorJv.
Terra Hug Spray Company, 145 Idaho at 900,188 P.3d at 842. The plain meaning of a statute, and,
by analogy, a rule of civil procedure, will prevail unless controverted by the clearly expressed intent
of the author or would lead to absurd results. Cj, id ("The plain meaning of a statute will prevail
unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plaining leads to absurd results.")
Here, the District Court erred in considering Boise Mode's Motion

Reconsideration

Further Consideration because the plain terms of LR.CP 11 (a)(2)(B) proscribe

of

reconsideration of orders entered on motions filed under LR.C.P. 59( e). LR.CP. 11 (a)(2)(B)
unequivocally proscribes motions for reconsideration of an order entered on a motion filed pursuant
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to 59(e). It states in its entirety:
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory
orders of the District Court may be made at any time before the entry of final
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment.
A motion for reconsideration of any order of the District Court made after entry of
final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order;
provided. there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the District
Court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a). 52(b)' 55(c). 59(a). 59(e).
59.1. 60(a). or 60(b).
(Emphasis added).
Despite the District Court's characterization of the Motion to Amend as

a motion

reconsideration and Motion to Amend, it was filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e), and was captioned as
such. R., at 481. The Court, in turn, granted it, and voided the Judgment, which had dismissed all
of DPP's Counterclaims and granted summary judgment in favor of Boise Mode. R., at 524.
Accordingly, the Motion to Amend should be treated as a motion to amend or alter ajudgment under
I.R.C.P. 59(e). See Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 115 P.3d 761 (App. 2005)(holding motion to
reconsider dismissal order "properly should be treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment
under I.R.c.P. 59 (e)"). Moreover, this accords with the purpose of I.R.c.P.

which is to

circumvent the need for an appeal by providing a District Court the opportunity to
factual error in the proceedings. See, e.g, Bank v. Neibaur,

or
(1

v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 1030 (App. 1982).
Furthermore, the District Court's rationale explaining why it had the authority to

Boise

Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration is flawed. First, it renders
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meaningless the last clause of IR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). See Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Company,
145 Idaho at 900, 188 P.3d at 842. Second, the case upon which the District Court relied, Elliot v.
Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 785,69 P.3d 1035,1046 (2003) is distinguishable because

that case did not involve a motion to reconsider an order entered on a motion filed

to

LRC.P. 59(e). See id., 69 P.3d at 1046. Third, motions for reconsideration are filed to
interlocutory orders, or orders made after the entry of final judgment.

are not

procedural vehicle to amend or alter a final judgment. See IR.C.P. 11
Nat. Bank v. David Steed & Assocs., 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (l992)(holding inappropriate to

consider motion for reconsideration as a IR.C.P. 60(b) motion because no final judgment entered);
Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988)(construing motion to consider new

information discovered after the entry of final judgment to be LRC.P. 60(b) motion). The District
Court erred in considering Boise Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration and,
therefore, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration and Further Consideration.

C.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to
DPP's Counterclaims.

In a two paragraph analysis and bolding, the District Court

Mode on

s

of (1) Constructive Eviction; (2) Breacb of Contract; and (3) Breach of Covenant
Fair Dealing. R, at 646. The District Court supported its dismissal of DPP' s counterclaims with
three propositions. First, tbe District Court stated that the Lease unambiguously stated that "there
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shall be no deduction, offset or abatement for any reason" unless otherwise allowed by the Lease.
R, at 646. Second, the District Court noted that DPP had to be current on the Lease payments to
"preserve their rights under" it. R, at 646. And third, the Court observed that the problems DPP
complained about "ended well before the Defendants vacated the premises." !d. Based on that, the
District Court dismissed DPP's Counterclaims.
This ruling is a profound abuse of discretion. Apparently, the District Court construed
language in the Lease barring deductions, offsets and abatements as a

by DPP of all

that could arise out of the Lease. 6 But that is an absurd interpretation that essentially results in DPP
being trapped in a Kafka-like tenancy despite the fact the record on summary judgment was replete
with instances that when construed in favor of DPP, the non-moving party, indicated Boise Mode
was breaching the express and/or implied terms of the Lease, as well as creating or allowing a
situation that constituted constructive eviction.
As Boise Mode argued to the District Court, the affidavits that Boise Mode submitted in
support of its motion for summary judgment raised ample questions of material fact. R, at 43-36.
As explained above, DPP formally advised Boise Mode's property manager on August 15.2008
to specific problems resulting from construction activities that make

Set-off normally applies when both claims are liquidated. See, e.g., Buchweiser v. Estate
of Laberer, 695 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Mo. 1985).
6
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inhibit" its "ability to conduct business as a professional services office .... "

R., at 303. 7 In a

March 6, 2009, letter to Ms Aeschliman, Timothy Pace reiterated the litany of problems that DPP
encountered at the Boise Mode building, which included debilitating construction noise and
disruptions during business hours that required DPP employees to work outside the office, dangerous
tools and materials left in hallways, an improperly installed ceiling fan that allowed water to leak into
the premises, and an instance where a construction crew without authorization took over DPP's
reception area. R., at 306. In a another letter from Mr. Pace to Ms. Aeschliman, dated May 20,
2009, DPP complained of disruptions in utility and elevator services to the already lengthy list. R.,
at 307.
The communications were not one-sided missives, but rather part of colloquy between DPP
and Boise Mode in which the latter acknowledged problems with the tenancy. Notably, in a May
13,2009, letter from Ms. Aeschliman to Timothy Pace, Boise Mode acknowledged that it was aware
that "construction of the building had caused inconveniences." R., at 294. Additionally, Ms.
Aeschliman admitted "there had been noise and disturbance" as a result of construction at the
building, and issues related to "noise, the elevator, the hallways, and etcetera.. R., at 300, 295.
Construed most favorably to DPP, the non-moving party, the forgoing
questions of fact of whether Boise Mode was breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

7 Again, Ms. Aeschliman states in her affidavit at paragraph 8 that she believes Mr. Pace's
letter should read "December 17,2008."
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implied in th Lease. 8 For example, exhibit E to the Office Lease, the terms and conditions of which
were expressly incorporated into it, states in relevant part:
Tenants, their agents, employees, or visitors, shall not make or commit any improper
noises or disturbances of any kind in the building, or make or define the water closets
... or interfere in any w~y with other Tenants or those having business with them.
R, at 59. 9 Based on this provision, DPP opposed Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment

advancing a third party beneficiary analysis.
Section 10.1 of the Lease, in turn, obligated Boise Mode "to repair and maintain the roof
structural portions of the Facility including the basis plumbing, air conditioning, heating and
electrical systems, exterior paint and trim" unless the tenant caused the damage. R, at 32. Section
19.3 sets forth the right to quiet enjoyment. See Exhibit A to Verified Complaint, at § 19.3. R, at

The covenant of good faith requires the parties of a contract to perform, in good faith, the
obligations contained in their agreement, and a violation occurs when either party violates, qualifies,
or significantly impairs any benefit or right ofthe other party under the contract-whether express or
implied. Van v. PortneufMedical Ctr., 47 Idaho 552,562,212 P.3d 982,992 (2009).
8

DPP subpoenaed the records of The North Face in part to obtain its lease with Boise Mode
to verify that it incorporated an analogous provision. At all relevant times, DPP was denied access
to a copy of that lease, but confirmed that it did only after the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Boise Mode and dismissed DPP's counterclaims. At the hearing on
Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration, counsel for Boise Mode
told the Court that DPP had possession of the subpoenaed The North Face documents.
Transcript of May 23, 2011, hearing, at 38. The reality was DPP only received copies of those
documents after the May 23, 2011, hearing. The further reality is that The North Face
did
incorporate language akin to that excerpted above from Exhibit E, see R, at 59, thereby supporting
DPP's theory of the case. If and to the extent the District Court believed Boise Mode's statement
that DPP possessed those documents, it could have erroneously thought they did not support its
theory.
9
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41. The ample facts set forth in the colloquy between DPP and Boise Mode, when viewed most
favorably to DPP, indicate Boise Mode breached express terms of the Lease, impaired DPP' s rights
under it and constructively evicted its tenant. The District Court usurped the jury's role in granting
summary judgment in favor of Boise Mode on DPP' s counterclaims. See Borah v. McCandless, 147
Idaho 73, 79, 205 P.3d 1209, 1215 (2009)(stating whether breach

contract is material

question offact); see also George v. Univ. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 30,37,822 P.2d
1991)(stating whether a party breached the implied covenant of good

IS

question of fact); Steiner v. Ziegler- Tamura Ltd., Co., 138 Idaho 238, 242-43, 61

a

595,599-600

(2002)(breach of covenant of good faith is issue for jury that should survives summary judgment).

D.

The District Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Boise Mode on Its
Causes of Action.

In its Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration, the
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Boise Mode on its claims of (1) Breach of
Contract; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Breach of Personal
Guaranty (Timothy Pace). The District Court's rationale was the same analysis it set

111

of dismissing DPP's counterclaims.
As with its dismissal of DPP's counterclaims, the District
judgment on Boise Mode's causes of action is erroneous because material

s
of

as to whether Boise Mode's breaches excused DPP's non-payment of rent. If a party materially
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breaches a contract, it excuses the other party's performance. State of Idaho v. Chacon, ] 46 Idaho
520, 524, 198 P.3d 749, 753 eCL App. 2008); 1. P. Stravens Planning Assoc., Inc. v. City of

Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 545, 928 P.2d 46,49 (Ct. App. 1996)(see also authority cited therein). As
discussed in Part ill (C) above, Boise Mode breached the express and implied terms of
These breaches, or at least many of them, oredated DPP's non-payment of rent
contended that DPP breached the Lease because it failed to pay rent in December
periodically thereafter. But as discussed above, the exhibits appended to

of

Aeschliman that Boise Mode filed in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, indicate that
DPP put Boise Mode on notice of its breaches of the Lease in August 2008. R., at 276, 278, 303,
306,307,321,324,326,327,328,294,295,300. As such, it is undisputed that Boise Mode was
first in breach. For the same reasons, it is also undeniable that DPP was entitled to quiet enjoyment
of the leased premises pursuant to Section 19.3 of the Lease. 10 The issue of whether Boise Mode's
actions and breaches were material such that they excused DPP' s non-performance is a question of
fact for the jury. See Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho at 79,205 P.3d at 1215. The District Court

10 Section 19.3 of the Office Lease states in full:
which states in full:

QUIET ENJOYMENT. Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying
rent and
monetary sums due under this Lease and performing the covenants and conditions of
this Lease and upon recognizing purchaser as Landlord, may quietly have, hold and
enjoy the Premises during the term hereof; subject, however, to loss by casualty and
all restrictions and covenants contained or referred to in this Lease.
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committed reversible error by invading the province of the jury.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment should be granted cautiously, and only after the parties
opportunity to conduct full and fair discovery. By denying DPP' s

had

for

District Court denied DPP of its opportunity to conduct full and fair
District Court abused its discretion, and, as a result, the Judgment ~""CUU'J'
The District Court also committed reversible error when it entertained Boise

s Motion for

Reconsideration and Further Consideration because it sought reconsideration of an order entered on
a motion filed under LRC.P. 59(e). And finally, the District Court committed reversible error by
granting summary judgment to Boise Mode on its causes of action and on DPP's counterclaims.
Accordingly, Boise Mode respectfully urges the Court to reverse the District Court's August 26,
2011, Judgment, and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Respectfully Submitted this
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day of February 2012.
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